Accounting for the banking crisis : repertoires of agency and structure. by Whittle,  A. & Mueller,  F.
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
23 June 2020
Version of attached file:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached file:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Whittle, A. and Mueller, F. (2016) 'Accounting for the banking crisis : repertoires of agency and structure.',
Critical discourse studies., 13 (1). pp. 20-40.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.1080/17405904.2015.1074598
Publisher's copyright statement:
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor Francis in Critical Discourse Studies on 12 October
2015, available online:http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/17405904.2015.1074598
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
  1 
This is the author(s) personal version of the manuscript, as accepted after the review process 
but prior to final layout and copyediting by the publisher. The final version is published as: 
 
Whittle A. & Mueller, F. (forthcoming) Accounting for the banking crisis: Repertoires of 
agency and structure. Forthcoming in Critical Discourse Studies (special issue on “The 
Discourse of Austerity”). 
 
Readers are kindly asked to use the official publication in references.  
 
Accounting for the Banking Crisis: Repertoires of Agency and 
Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  2 
 
Accounting for the Banking Crisis: Repertoires of Agency and 
Structure 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we conduct a discourse analysis of the testimony of the leaders of 
British banks during a UK public inquiry into the financial crisis. We examine the 
discursive devices that were used to handle the accountability of banking leaders, 
particularly their role in the events leading up to the collapse and subsequent state 
bail-out of the banks. Our analysis identifies two competing interpretative repertoires: 
an agentic repertoire and a structural repertoire. These repertoires are significant, we 
suggest, because they inform understanding of what went wrong with the banking 
system and what should be done to reform and regulate the sector. We conclude by 
calling for the notions of agency and structure to be treated as an object of study 
within discourse analysis rather than a form of social scientific explanation. 
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Introduction 
There is a long-running ‘yo-yo’ like movement in the social sciences between more 
systemic approaches and more agentic approaches to the study of social life 
(Wetherell, 2005). According to discourse analyst Margaret Wetherell (2005), the 
agency/structure debate needs a radical new approach. Rather than endlessly cycling 
around this fruitless debate within pre-existing binary distinctions, Wetherell argues 
that we need to understand how social actors themselves handle agency and structure 
– the internal and external bases of action – as part of their discursive practices. In this 
paper, we take up Wetherell’s proposal by examining agency and structure as 
discursive resources used by members of a particular social group in accounting for 
action. Our central question is: how do members make sense of, and account for, the 
underlying causes of events? We propose viewing ‘agency’ and ‘structure’ as 
practical issues, which are central not only to scholarly theoretical debates but also to 
‘mundane reason’ (Pollner, 1987). For example, how do members of a particular 
social group establish the presence of choice, freedom, will and intent? When do they 
invoke external determinants and constraints for their action? What practical actions 
are achieved in the process? And what broader patterns of culturally-established 
sensemaking - or ‘interpretative repertoires’ as Wetherell and others call them (Potter 
& Wetherell, 1987: 149; Wetherell & Potter, 1988: 171) - are available in a culture or 
a community to make sense of questions of agency and structure?  
We seek to advance Wetherell’s agenda by exploring how agency discourse is 
employed in the process of accounting for the causes of the financial crisis. We 
examine a public hearing in the UK involving testimony by British bankers implicated 
in the financial crisis. We advance Wetherell’s agenda by bringing together 
theoretical resources from a range of fields including critical socio-linguistics, 
analytical philosophy, ethnomethodology, discursive psychology and linguistic 
anthropology. Discourses of agency and structure, we show, play an integral role in 
the negotiation of responsibility and accountability in events such as the financial 
crisis, with implications for how these events are understood and acted upon.  
 
The Discourse of Agency 
According to Kenneth Gergen (2009: 79), the discourse of agency is “significant and 
pervasive” in modern society, but is also historically and culturally specific. Gergen 
traces the debate about human agency back to Aristotle, for whom there resided an 
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active force within each person that was responsible for decisions and actions. The 
modernist notion of the “free but ultimately responsible agent” includes the “capacity 
to choose” and “direct our actions according to our decisions” (Gergen, 2009: 79): 
what Harré and Stearns (1995: 6) call the “myth of the ‘will’”. Analytical philosophy 
has distinguished “action” from an “event” through the invocation of cognitive states 
such as intention, choice and purpose (Ahearn, 2001). For example, “walking down 
the stairs” is seen as an “action”, whereas “falling down the stairs” is merely an event 
or “happening” (cf. Davidson, 1971). It is precisely this notion of the discrete, 
bounded locus of agency that has been the target of much post-structuralist critique in 
recent decades (e.g. Knights & Willmott, 1989). Indeed, in other systems of meaning, 
the ‘modern’ notion of the centered, intentional ‘I’ may well disappear: Herrigel 
(1953/1981), for example, describes the mastery of Zen archery in Buddhist 
mythology as follows: “Is it ‘I’ who draws the bow, or is it the bow that draws me 
into the state of highest tension? Do “I” hit the goal, or does the goal hit me? ... Bow, 
arrow, goal and ego, all melt into one another, so that I can no longer separate them” 
(p. 88). In Zen discourse, then, action no longer requires reference to an intentional 
agent who is purported to have degrees of ‘agency’.  
In this paper, we approach this debate in a different way. Rather than seeking 
to advance the post-structuralist critique, or the philosophical debate, we instead seek 
to follow a more ethnomethodologically-informed approach and study how the 
discourse of agency is deployed as part of member’s social reasoning and social 
practice (Garfinkel, 1967). The “discourse grammars” of everyday life, Harré (1995) 
suggests, follow typically two different types of accountability: members variously 
depict themselves as passive beings dictated by external influences to which they are 
subject (what Harré calls the ‘Humean’ schema), or active beings with productive 
capacities (what Harré calls the ‘agentive’ schema). For Harré, these two different 
schemas are alternative discursive presentations of the self that occur as part of 
practical moral accountability rather than mental mechanisms of cognitive processing 
– a point highly relevant to the discourse that emerged in the wake of the 2008 
financial crisis.  
Agency as a ‘discourse grammar’, we suggest, performs a number of different 
social actions, such as allocating blame, providing excuses and presenting a version 
of the self. For example, stressing one’s agency can act as a form of expression of 
personal identity (Harré & van Lagenhove, 1999: 24): presenting oneself as having 
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chosen one of many possible courses of action (“I could have done X, but I chose to 
do Y”), where that choice displays something about the kind of person we are. 
Agency is emphasised by presenting the self as an “integrated centre and originator of 
their actions” (Potter, Stringer & Wetherell, 1984: 160). In contrast, positioning 
oneself as powerless and robbed of choice positions the person in terms of a lack of 
agency, with attendant lack of responsibility or blame. In the section that follows, we 
develop our theoretical position on the practical reasoning and accounting that 
discourses of agency and structure accomplish. 
 
 
Practical Reasoning and Practical Accounting: What Discourses of Agency and 
Structure Accomplish  
The field of discursive psychology has been at the forefront of the development of 
insights into agency and structure as practical accounting procedures. Studies in this 
field have focused on how “agency, intent, doubt, belief, prejudice, and so on, are 
built, made available, or countered ‘indirectly’, through descriptions of actions, 
events, objects, persons or settings” (Potter & Edwards, 2003: 171). This allows us to 
analyze seemingly neutral descriptions of ‘states of affairs’ and ‘events’ in terms of 
what this does in specifying protagonists’ past (and present) agency. As Tilly (2008: 
12) notes, judging agency relies on being able to ascertain whether the action was 
performed “more or less deliberately with knowledge of the likely consequences” 
(Tilly, 2008: 12). A central condition for accountability, then, is that the actor is 
deemed responsible within a particular moral order. The actor must be deemed 
conscious and competent enough to be capable of reflections on their own actions; 
and the actor must not have been caught up in external conditions that would have 
prevented them from exerting agency. Thus, moral attributions can often be 
accomplished “through what look like (or are produced as) straightforward event 
descriptions” (Edwards & Potter, 2005: 242): for example, descriptions of external 
conditions may provide an account why a certain action supposedly fell short of 
certain standards.  
At this point, it is worthwhile introducing the distinction drawn by Scott and 
Lyman (1968) between excuses, where the speaker concedes the moral questions 
about their behaviour, but seeks to avoid being attributed personal responsibility 
(agency), and justifications, where the speaker admits personal responsibility (agency) 
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but challenges the moral critique regarding the action (see also Austin, 1970; Harré, 
1995). Llewellyn and Harrison’s (2006) study of corporate communications found a 
heavy use of a syntactic feature known as ‘passive transformation’ (Fowler, 1991: 77-
8), where the object of the active verb becomes the subject. For example, rather than 
placing human subjects in the normal grammatical place of the subject, it was instead 
an institution, an abstract concept (such as ‘quality’) or simply a person or persons 
unknown in the case of agentless-passive sentences (e.g. “New jobs will emerge and 
some jobs will go over the next twelve months”, Llewellyn and Harrison, 2006: 595) 
that are the ‘subject’. Llewellyn and Harrison (2006: 578) argue that these features 
matter because they imply that “developments ‘simply happened’ and were not the 
result of the actions of specific groups”. Most importantly, for our purposes, these 
discursive features also act to reduce or remove the agency of both the author(s) of the 
text and those on whose behalf the text was written.  
The ethnomethodological study by Lynch and Bogen (1996) of the public 
hearings following the Iran-Contra affair also shows how agentic and structural 
discourse was employed by Oliver North, a US army officer at the centre of the 
controversy, to handle his accountability for problematic events. Lynch and Bogen 
show how North used a subtle rhetorical ‘switch’ to describe his act of shredding 
documents, not as a calculated decision to avoid certain documents being seized by 
investigators, but rather as part of normal, automatic, accepted, everyday practice by 
painting a “backdrop of shredding-as-usual” (p.173). North handled the accusation of 
having been conscious and strategic, i.e. having exerted ‘blameworthy agency’ in his 
shredding activity, by emphasizing the structural, routine causes of his individual 
actions. Accordingly, due to existing routines he had “good and sufficient reasons to 
destroy documents” on a daily basis, indicated by the fact that “the government buys 
shredders by the tens and dozens” (p.22). This description of events handles agency in 
such a way that it downplays the active agency involved in shredding documents, by 
presenting it as a normal part of the structure and roles of the organization: “what 
everyone does” and “what my job demands”. In so doing, North positions his 
accountability as follows: I did not engage in pre-planned, strategic shredding, which 
would indeed be bad (excuse), I only engaged in routine shredding, which is not 
blameworthy (justification). 
This is a practical application of a research agenda that seeks to examine the 
discourses people “employ for repudiating or taking on responsibility and thus 
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displaying our agency or lack of it” (Harré, 1995: 129). Indeed, descriptions can often 
be seen as occurring “in the context of potential blame” raising the spectre of potential 
“culpability in those events” (Edwards, 1997: 97). In the courtroom, a defense 
barrister for example makes certain inferences available to the jury by using specific, 
carefully chosen descriptions (Edwards & Potter, 1992: 50-1). In Pollner’s (1987) 
classic study of traffic court interaction, the forms of mundane reasoning about 
agency (or lack thereof) employed by judges have practical consequences for the 
judicial outcome. For example, judges routinely employ common sense notions of 
probable, or typical (Schutz, 1967), intention in their reasoning about agency in order 
to ascertain the difference between criminal intent and an accident. The discourse of 
agency means that the same ‘action’ (such as driving on the wrong side of a divided 
highway) by an eighteen year old is not the same ‘action’ as the one performed by an 
‘oldster’ (Pollner, 1987): the former is viewed as an outcome of criminal, intended 
recklessness (agentive) the latter an outcome of bad luck or circumstances (for 
instance, being blinded by the sun).1  
Heritage and Clayman’s (2010) conversation analytic study of the beating of 
Rodney King in Los Angeles in March 1991 showed that the prosecution or acquittal 
of the four police officers depended upon the construction of King as being portrayed 
as either a passive victim of police brutality (action without agency), or as an 
aggressively resistant and uncooperative suspect (action with agency). Small 
movements of the body that were captured on a video camera, such as the raising of 
his knee, were interpreted by the defence attorneys as indicative of a wilful move of 
aggression, rather than, say, a defensive move or a reflex response (Heritage & 
Clayman, 2010: 182-5). Agency (or a lack thereof) was thus constructed through the 
interpretative resources and descriptions brought to bear on the video recording. The 
“fact” of the beating was not denied but its blameworthiness was denied by presenting 
it as a reaction rather than an agentive and deliberately chosen action.  
Work in the field of linguistic anthropology has revealed the operation of 
similar grammatical structures and linguistic features of agency discourse in other 
cultural contexts. In Duranti’s (1990) study of Samoan society, crimes and disputes 
are resolved through the gathering of a “fono”, a politico-judiciary meeting where 
those in dispute gather in front of the “matai”, tribal leaders or titled individuals, to 
                                                 
1 In some criminal justice systems, this distinction is expressed for example through distinctions 
between ‘culpable homicide’, ‘manslaughter’ and ‘murder’.  
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establish the facts and enable retributions and reparations to be administered. 
According to Duranti (1990), the struggle between prosecution and defence is 
negotiated through a linguistic exercise in agency avowal and disavowal. Those 
wishing to accuse a person of stealing, for instance, use grammatical features, such as 
transitive clauses with an explicit agent, to define the accused as a purposeful and 
intentional agent. Those who want to resist a particular framing of past events employ 
a series of grammatical strategies for mitigating agency, such as case marking, lexical 
choice and reported speech. Duranti (1990: 661-2) concludes that “the expressing of 
agency is a delicate process that must be managed”, with very real consequences for 
those involved, as the “grammatical form of utterances becomes an integral part of the 
political process”.  
In our study, we aim to show how discourse of agency and structure was used 
to account for the financial crisis – in ways that had very real implications for how the 
crisis was made sense of and acted upon. We will first discuss the methods and 
methodology employed in this study.  
 
 
Methodology   
The theoretical perspective we have outlined above, in particular the 
ethnomethodological perspective underlying work in the field of discursive 
psychology, involves a particular approach to data collection and analysis. First, it 
involves a commitment to studying naturally occurring data because it enables us to 
examine the accounts constructed in situ by those involved in the sense-making 
following the financial crisis. These naturally occurring materials are preferred to the 
kinds of post-hoc rationalisations produced in interviews (Potter & Hepburn, 2005). 
Naturally occurring accounts are important precisely because they influenced the way 
in which the financial crisis was both understood and acted upon. Following Brown’s 
(2005) analysis of the reports following the collapse of Barings Bank, we view the 
Treasury Committee Hearings that we analyze as constituting an “important 
discursive contribution to people’s understanding of a significant episode in UK and 
global banking” (p. 1584). One limitation of this publicly-available data source is that 
detailed Jeffersonian transcription, the established method of ethnomethodology, 
conversation analysis and discursive psychology, is not possible. Only the official 
Treasury Committee transcription was available to us, meaning complex interactional 
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features such as pauses and overlapping talk could not be transcribed. We 
acknowledge this methodological limitation, but remain convinced of the overall 
value of analysing public texts because they show how discourse is used in “creating, 
clarifying, sustaining and modifying” a particular “version of ‘reality’” (Brown, 2005: 
1584).  
Second, our theoretical approach brings with it certain ontological 
commitments. In line with discursive psychology, we view talk as a medium of social 
action, rather than a reflection of inner cognitive entities, such as thoughts, memories, 
emotions or attitudes (Edwards, 1997: 90-96). Hence, the job of the analyst is not to 
delineate the ‘true’ or ‘correct’ account among the competing versions produced by 
the bankers and questioners in our study. Rather, our analysis focuses on how these 
versions are constructed to present themselves as a plausible, factual or objective 
version of events and, in this paper specifically, the agency (or lack of) in those 
events. This leads us to examine the “range of styles, linguistic resources and 
rhetorical devices” (Edwards & Potter, 1992: 28) used in this process: which we refer 
to simply as ‘discursive devices’ (Edwards & Potter, 1992: 68, see also Mueller & 
Whittle, 2011) – a term we explain in more detail shortly.  
The transcript we analyse was part of a series of meetings and reports 
announced by the UK Treasury Committee on 25 November 2008 as part of its 
Banking Crisis inquiry. The inquiry involved a series of 17 oral evidence sessions, 
which we term “hearings”, involving banking executives, senior politicians, regulators 
and experts. This paper focuses specifically on the hearing held on Tuesday 10 
February 2009 when four former bank executives were questioned by a panel of 
politicians (Members of Parliament) from different political parties. The questions 
asked during the hearing were numbered in the publicly available transcript and are 
referenced accordingly (eg. Q1570) in our discussion. A list of the participants in the 
hearing quoted in this paper are given in Table 1 below.  
 
--- Insert Table 1 here --- 
 
 
We focus on this single hearing for one simple reason: given we are interested 
in how accountability and blame is managed through discourses of agency and 
structure, this particular hearing was where these issues were most prevalent. Other 
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hearings involved actors whose responsibility was less the target of enquiry, such as 
expert academics and economists and representatives of governmental departments. 
Naturally, one important direction for future research would be to extend our analysis 
to the discourse of responsibility directed at other institutions, in the UK and beyond 
(see e.g. Mueller, Carter and Whittle, forthcoming).  
 Our analysis began by identifying the linguistic features of the accounts of 
both the questioners (politicians) and respondents (bankers). We were guided by 
insights from discursive psychology to identify the forms of ‘discursive devices’ – 
turns of phrase, metaphors, pronouns, grammatical structures, linguistic techniques 
and so on – that were used in the accounts. Discursive devices are “language-based 
tools that are employed as part of interactional business” (Mueller & Whittle, 2011: 
188). In this case, the interactional business is one of conducting a public inquiry (the 
role of the politicians) and explaining past actions (the banking leaders). A discursive 
device can be something as simple as a collective pronoun like “we”, or a more 
complex linguistic structure or frame such as footing (Mueller & Whittle, 2011). The 
concept of discursive devices is a more micro concept than the concept of 
interpretative repertoires, which refers to the “recurrently used systems of terms for 
characterizing and evaluating actions, events, or other phenomena” (Potter & 
Wetherell, 1987: 149). Discursive devices therefore provide the linguistic building 
blocks through which interpretative repertoires are built. Our analysis identified two 
competing interpretative repertoires – an agentic repertoire and a structural repertoire 
– from the patterns of accounting given by the politicians and the bankers 
respectively. To be clear, our claim is not that these repertoires are generalizable 
beyond our data-set: this is a matter for future empirical research. Rather, they are 
repertoires identified as recurrently used within the transcripts we analysed. Issues of 
generality and wider relevance are discussed in more detail in the conclusion.   
 
Agency and the Financial Crisis: A Discursive Devices Analysis 
In this section, we present illustrative extracts of our discourse analysis of the 
transcript of the Treasury Select Committee meeting on 10 February 2009. Our aim is 
to show the ways in which discursive devices, as summarised in Tables 2 and 3, were 
used to handle the accountability of the bankers, particularly their role in the events 
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leading up to the collapse and subsequent state bail-out of the banks. We focus our 
analysis more closely on the way agency is handled in the responses by the bankers. 
While the politicians (questioners) used a range of devices to achieve agency 
attribution (see Table 2) – what we call the ‘agentic repertoire’, the bankers 
(respondents) used a more sophisticated array of devices to handle their agency in 
ways that did not concede personal responsibility (see Table 3) – what we call the 
‘structural repertoire’.  
 
--- Insert Tables 2 and 3 here --- 
 
 
 
 
 
In this extract, the questioner Mr Fallon poses his question in terms of very personal 
responsibility and accountability. The phrase “You were in charge of the Board” 
implies that McKillop, as Chairman at the time, had ultimate responsibility for the 
decisions of the Board: the “buck stops here”. Fallon uses the second-person singular 
pronoun (see Table 2) “You” when directly attributing blame for “destroy[ing] a great 
British bank” and “cost[ing] the taxpayer £20 billion”. Fallon makes it clear that he is 
using the term ‘you’ to refer to McKillop personally, not the institution (the bank). 
Harré (1995: 124) argues that “one of the main ways in which we take and assign 
responsibility is by the use of pronouns”. In this case, the pronoun “you” works to 
position agency and responsibility firmly on the shoulders of the individual being 
interrogated, McKillop. Specific agents, not the system as a whole, are held to blame.  
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McKillop’s response re-formulates this accusation of blame using a 
combination of nominalisation and non-transactive sentence structure (see Table 3). 
Non-transactive sentences involve one subject and imply no causal processes, such as 
“A man aged 45 was shot” (Potter, Stringer & Wetherell, 1984: 91). Transactive 
sentences, in contrast, involve one active subject and one passive subject/object, who 
is acted upon, such as “Police shot a 45 year old man” (ibid). Nominalisation refers to 
a similar linguistic phenomenon, the act of replacing named subjects with nominalised 
verbs, adjectives or adverbs to avoid mentioning those who performed the action, 
particularly to avoid attribution of blame or responsibility (Billig, 2008). Violent 
actions by police, for example, may be described in a nominalised form: “violence 
was perpetrated”, “bitterness ... commenced” (Wetherell and Potter, 1989: 210-11) to 
avoid mentioning the person(s) or institution(s) involved. In this case, the personal 
responsibility imputed by Fallon (“You”) is replaced with an impersonal reference to 
“the deal”, a third-person inanimate noun. In so doing, McKillop not only refuses to 
concede personal responsibility but he also diffuses and distributes agency by 
referring to a “deal” that involved many different agents, not only himself. 
Nominalisation can play an ideological role by obfuscating agency (Billig, 2008) and 
instead creating third-person entities which are said to act: “the deal”, “the financial 
case”. Hence, the nominalised and non-transactive grammatical structure of 
McKillop’s talk acts to perform impersonalisation and agency distribution. 
Fallon’s next question (Q1678) attempts to reverse McKillop’s 
impersonalisation and distribution of agency by returning to the second-person 
singular pronoun “you”. McKillop again rejects this attribution of personal 
responsibility for “failure” by using the first-person plural pronoun “we”: he claims 
“we did in fact make a bad mistake...”. Plural pronouns (see Table 3) such as “we” of 
course work to distribute agency to a collective. Indeed, debate is ongoing within 
group agency theory about whether collectives such as corporations can be held to 
have ‘agency’ in the same way as individuals (List & Pettit, 2011).  
McKillop then uses two further discursive devices to justify his role in the 
events surrounding the purchase of ABN Amro. First, he appeals to “retrospect”, the 
benefit of hindsight (see Table 3) as a justification for why the outcomes that seem so 
obvious today were not so obvious at the time. This was in fact a common device used 
by all four witnesses throughout the hearing. The terms “retrospect”, “hindsight” and 
“prophesize” were used in more than a dozen places throughout the transcript. The 
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message suggested by these terms is that banking executives should not be expected 
to be “fortune tellers” who are able to predict the future. The accusation of blame is 
thereby presented as an “unfair” accusation: asking them to have done something that 
was humanly impossible. According to Scott and Lyman (1968: 48-9), this is a 
common form of defeasibility account where the speaker “might excuse himself from 
responsibility by claiming that certain information was not available to him [sic], 
which, if it had been, would have altered his behaviour” (p. 48). This admits that the 
person had “free will” but not complete “knowledge” with which to exercise it. 
McKillop’s account follows the logic of the ‘gravity disclaimer’ outlined by Scott and 
Lyman (1968: 48-9), where the outcome was known to be a possibility but that its 
probability was incalculable.   
Another of McKillop’s tactics combined an appeal to a prevailing view and 
higher authority (see Table 3). McKillop suggests that his agency was bounded and 
structured by prevailing viewpoints and opinions: the available evidence, shareholder 
opinions, and so on. It was not simply his choice or discretion to purchase ABN 
Amro, it was part of an existing momentum or flow of activity. He did not have the 
ability to act freely of his own volition; he was ‘caught up in a wave’. His appeal to 
“regulatory approvals” invokes a higher authority that can be held to share 
responsibility (and agency) for the decisions made. The appeal to ‘officialdom’ is 
particularly significant because it helps McKillop to present his decisions as one that 
met with official regulatory approval: he was not a ‘lone ranger’ acting alone, making 
decisions of his own choosing, he was only doing what others agreed with - thus there 
was social legitimacy attached to his actions. These appeals work to invoke a sense of 
consensus, albeit not unanimous (in the case of shareholder approval), to justify his 
decision and distribute agency.  
Edwards and Potter (1992: 108) argue that ‘consensus’ can serve as a rhetorical 
device to warrant (or indeed undermine) versions of events. Witnesses in courts, for 
instance, often appeal to consensus across a group of observers and corroboration 
between independent individuals as evidence of the ‘independence’ and ‘validity’ of 
their accounts (ibid). The work of Pomerantz (1986) on ‘extreme case formulations’ 
(such as “everybody knows/thinks/accepts X”) is also relevant here. These 
formulations construct certain things as universal and normative, enabling agency to 
be shifted from the personal to the universal. The implication generated for McKillop 
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is that he should not be held personally responsible for something that (almost) 
everyone agreed to: thereby diffusing agency and, in turn, responsibility and blame.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mann’s question centres on whether responsibility could (or should) be attributed to 
any incumbent of senior management, and whether Goodwin could (or should) be 
held personally responsible. The concept of role (see Table 3) is used here to 
negotiate the agency of the incumbent, Fred Goodwin. This is reminiscent of Edwards 
and Potter’s (1992) analysis of how Thatcher handled her accountability for Lawson’s 
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resignation as Chancellor. By describing Alan Walters’ (her ‘inofficial’ economic 
advisor) behaviour in such a way to make it appear as “unremarkable, scripted … 
acting in role” (p. 148), the implication is that if Walters acted in role, then Lawson’s 
resignation can only be blamed on himself.  
Goodwin flatly denies the accusation of personal responsibility by stating: 
“No, I do not feel I am particularly personally culpable”. Agency is attributed to the 
role, rather than the incumbent. Whilst Goodwin uses the phrase “I fully accept my 
responsibility”, the question arises whether this is a ‘show concession’: where an 
often marginal point is conceded to bolster the overall argument, making the speaker 
appear more reasonable and fair by conceding the validity of the counter-position 
(Antaki & Wetherell, 1999: 23). As we will discuss below, devices of externalisation 
are employed later on in his statement which subtly qualify his ‘admission of agency’.  
Goodwin refuses to be drawn into a discussion of whether he made the 
situation “better” through his actions as Chief Executive of the Bank. This avoidance 
is significant for our purposes because it works as a refusal to assess his own agency – 
his capacity for action, his discretionary judgment, his ability to ‘make a difference’ 
and so on - during his tenure as Chief Executive of the Royal Bank of Scotland 
(RBS). To agree with the claim that he made things “better” would run the risk of 
inviting ridicule: could another CEO really have caused an even greater disaster? In 
fact, Goodwin takes up a supposed ‘modest’ position of admitting that others could in 
fact be more “brilliant” than him. Instead of answering the question of whether he 
made RBS “better”, Goodwin offers an admission of “responsibility”, even though 
this was not the question asked. As has been documented in studies of news 
interviews, respondents – just like in this extract – often refuse to directly address the 
question in order to reject the ‘trap’ set by the adversarial preface of the question 
(Heritage & Clayman, 2010: Ch7).  
Immediately after his ‘show concession’ admission of responsibility, Goodwin 
moves on to qualify and justify the actions for which he has admitted responsibility. 
First, he locates the cause of the problem in the world ‘out there’ (the sudden 
“collapse in markets”), over which he had no control, a case of externalisation (see 
Table 3). The metaphor of the ‘tsunami’, used by Alan Greenspan in his address to the 
House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform2, was 
                                                 
2 “Financial crisis 'like a tsunami'”. BBC News. Thursday, 23 October 2008 
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also used by the bankers in our case, and is a good example of such a device for 
externalizing agency. Second, the phrase “it could have happened to others” plays an 
important role in Goodwin’s account. This phrase attributes the collapse of the Bank 
to bad luck (see Table 3), as opposed to decisions that could be attributed to himself 
and/or others. The idea that “it could have happened to anyone” distinguishes between 
responsibility for an action and responsibility for an outcome. Negative outcomes are 
presented as bordering on ‘random’, removing the emphasis on agency from all those 
involved. This formulation presents Goodwin as being powerless to stop the crisis (he 
had no control over events) and no different to others (there was no reason it affected 
RBS as opposed to other banks).  
Thirdly, the phrase “there but for the grace of God” is important for how it 
handles Goodwin’s agency. Reflecting upon the possibility that others could be 
feeling ‘lucky’ not to be ‘facing the music’ having made the same decisions, implies 
that Goodwin is simply an ‘unlucky’ person (see Table 3): any other person in the 
same role could have done the same thing. His agency is presented as something 
common to any incumbent, not himself personally. Agency is thereby ascribed to the 
role position rather than the individual. We should remind ourselves that whether we 
emphasize commonality or difference is rhetorical work, that is, it is not stating an 
absolute truth but rather a position in an argument (Billig, 1987/96). For instance, one 
can make the point that all U.S. investment banks were caught up in the crisis; but one 
can also make the point that some were caught up more than others.  
Fourth, a particular subject-object grammatical arrangement (see Table 3) is 
used in Goodwin’s description of events, with consequences for how agency is 
presented. The “collapse in confidence … hit us” presents the collapse as the subject, 
with RBS (and Goodwin himself) as the object. This grammatical form attributes 
agency to the collapse, away from himself and the bank. Consider the contrast with 
this subject-object arrangement: “our actions led to a collapse in confidence”. Fifth, 
the emphasis on “moving forward positively” before the collapse also acts to present 
the “collapse” as something that was a surprise (see Table 3). Presenting events as 
unexpected works to create a “sense of anomalousness” (Potter, Stringer & Wetherell, 
1984: 89): as in, “I expected X, but instead Y happened”. This is a common linguistic 
strategy known as a “contrast structure” (ibid: 88), used to present descriptions as 
factual by claiming they are counter-dispositional, that is, not the outcome of 
particular motives, biases or pre-conceptions. Contrast structures are used to make 
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accounts more credible and have been found in stories of paranormal encounter 
stories, for instance (Wooffitt, 1992). In our case, presenting events as unexpected 
helps to down-play agency by suggesting “if I willfully and intentionally created this 
situation, why was it a surprise to me?” A contrast is also made between the ordinary 
‘business as usual’ (‘we were moving forward positively’) and the extra-ordinary 
events ‘post-Lehmans’ (see e.g. Sacks, 1992: 215; Edwards, 1997: 99). These 
constructions made it appear that events happened to them, not by them. The agency 
the bank claimed to have exercised pre-crisis - responsible, conscientious and prudent 
agency – was apparently continued post-crisis.      
It is important to focus not only on how people handle accountability for 
reported events, but also how accountability for the reporting itself is handled in talk 
(Edwards & Potter, 1992: 166-7; Potter, Edwards & Wetherell, 1993: 389). For 
discursive psychology, these two aspects of accountability are fundamentally 
interlinked, such that the former can be deployed for the latter, and vice versa. For 
example, the bankers attend not only to their accountability for past events (as senior 
managers within ‘failed’ banks), but also their accountability in the current social 
setting (as ‘witnesses’ in a public enquiry). The phrase “unreasonable” used by 
Goodwin is a good example to illustrate how these two aspects of accountability 
relate: Goodwin is not only handling his accountability for his past actions (whether 
or not he did a ‘good job’ in his role of CEO at RBS), but also his accountability in 
the ongoing testimonial interaction (as someone who is a cooperative, reasonable and 
honest witness). Most importantly for our analysis, the latter serves to bolster his 
account of the former: presenting himself as a modest and reasonable character rather 
than a reckless and buccaneering agent. 
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Interestingly, this is one of very few instances where one of the bankers fully accepts 
and agrees with the formulation of the questioner, without significant re-formulation, 
avoidance or qualification of the question itself. Here, Goodwin unreservedly agrees 
with Ainger’s formulation of the cause of the crisis lying in “the culture”. Goodwin 
then appeals to the abstract forces (see Table 3) of “the market” to explain the 
remuneration practices of the industry. Why, then, do the questioner and respondent 
seem to develop a shared discourse of ‘structure’ on this occasion? Or, to put it 
differently, why did Nick Ainger, who is a Welsh Labour MP, make it seemingly so 
easy and comfortable for Goodwin? It would be fair to assume that terms such as “the 
culture” and “the market” were so readily accepted by Goodwin because of their 
diffuse sense of agency and responsibility. Placing agency in the hands of abstract 
forces such as “culture” and “market” reduces the level of responsibility and potential 
blame attributable to individuals such as Goodwin. Individuals, according to this 
formulation, should not be held responsible for structural forces that are out of their 
hands. The individual is presented as “passive”, not an “initiator”, simply responding 
to external stimuli or forces (Harré, 1995: 128).  
The phrase “people and teams do move” is a script formulation (Edwards, 
1997), which expresses some presupposed widely held ‘knowledge’ about some 
general pattern: the ‘way things are’. The term “appropriately remunerated” contains a 
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generalised script that suggests that high performance and high remuneration are 
causally linked regardless of the desire or intention of the speaker: it is ‘just the way 
the world works’. In fact, Goodwin alludes to exactly this point when he argues: “It is 
very difficult for an individual institution to make a change unilaterally”. He also 
attributes the source of these remuneration practices to “the United States”. Both 
individuals and institutions are presented as victims of abstract forces (see Table 3) of 
labour markets and cultures that have arrived from elsewhere, beyond their control. 
Goodwin also uses active verbs for inanimate entities or abstractions (e.g. “these 
practices have come across from the United States”). This is a grammatical pattern 
commonly found in scientific writing (Gilbert and Mulkay, 1984), where abstract 
notions are given human-like agency: “The analysis suggests...”, “the findings 
show...”, “the hypothesis proposes” and so on. This is another instance of an 
impersonal construction that eliminates individual agency (nominalisation - see Table 
3). In the case of “practices have been imported”, the passive voice (see Table 3) 
eliminates the agent(s), even though these bankers were obviously among these agents 
who imported these practices. The notion of culture is also subjected to 
nominalization by treating it as a substance, a thing that acts. The bankers thereby 
claim to have been confronted by ‘the systemic risks’, but without being involved in 
creating them. While human “practices” and “cultures” are by definition man-made, it 
is noteworthy that no account is given about who made them.     
 
Conclusion and Theoretical Implications 
Notions of agency and structure, or more broadly the internal/external and 
subjective/objective bases of action, have an enduring presence in both classical and 
contemporary social scientific theory (e.g. Parsons, 1937; Giddens, 1984; Emirbayer 
& Mische, 1998). Yet, as Ahearn (2001) notes, the notion of agency is an academic 
abstraction that is generally underspecified, misused, fetishized or reified by social 
scientists. In this paper, we have sought to approach the question of agency and 
structure in a very different way. By dismantling the “inner/outer distinction” (Harré 
& Stearns, 1995) and other forms of reification, we instead examined “how, on what 
occasions and in the service of what kinds of interactional practices discourse handles 
and manages its objective and subjective bases” (Edwards, 2007: 31). Thus, we have 
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focused the analytic lens on how internal choices and motivations and external 
constraints were constructed within accounts of the banking crisis (Wetherell, 2005).  
From our analysis of the testimony of senior British bankers to the UK public 
inquiry into the Banking Crisis, we have identified two competing interpretative 
repertoires. In the questions by the politicians, the bankers were positioned in an 
agentic repertoire as ‘agents-with-agency’, in line with what Harré (1995) calls the 
‘agentive’ schema. In contrast, the responses by the bankers positioned themselves 
within a structural repertoire as ‘agents-without-agency’, in line with what Harré calls 
the ‘Humean’ schema. Our analysis has also shown the range of discursive devices 
through which these two repertoires were constructed. As a result, we propose 
viewing agency as a “linguistic and socio-culturally mediated concept” (Ahearn, 
2001: 115) rather than a property of social actors. Our analysis has shown that degrees 
of agency are the product of accounts, constructed in often unnoticed ways through 
the choice of discursive devices used and embedded within the grammatical forms of 
language employed.  
In the sections that follow, we shall discuss the implications of our study for 
our understanding of the causes and consequences of the financial crisis, followed by 
a discussion of directions for future research.   
 
Implications for the understanding of the financial crisis 
Discursive devices are, in our view, the linguistic building blocks through which the 
understanding of the causes of the financial crisis were constructed. The many 
accounts in circulation – of which official public inquiries are significant and 
influential - eventually became sedimented into the widely accepted and taken-for-
granted versions of “what happened” and “why” – part of the accepted story-line of 
the big crash. Those wanting to shape these accepted story-lines often, of course, have 
a particular stake or interest in the matter. For example, former British Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown (2010: 10) identified as the “true cause” of the financial crisis 
“recklessness and irresponsibility all too often created by greed. Money that should 
have capitalised the financial system went instead directly to excessive rewards.” By 
linking irresponsibility to rewards, the finger of blame moves away from politicians, 
and the regulatory bodies they oversee, and points directly and almost exclusively at 
bankers. Others provide a more kaleidoscopic picture of causes and corresponding 
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institutions, policies, actions or persons that could be blamed (Davies, 2010; McLean 
& Nocera, 2010).  
An influential report written by a group of eminent British academics, in 
response to a question by the Queen “why had nobody noticed that the credit crunch 
was on its way?”, blamed a “"psychology of denial” and, more specifically, “financial 
wizards” who managed to convince themselves and the world's politicians that they 
had found clever ways to spread risk throughout financial markets. Overall, the 
judgment points to a wide spreading of blame: “the failure to foresee the timing, 
extent and severity of the crisis and to head it off … was principally a failure of the 
collective imagination of many bright people, both in this country and internationally, 
to understand the risks to the system as a whole.”3 Here, the actions of specific 
persons (the ‘wizards’) are blamed as well as the very nebulous entity “the collective 
imagination of many bright people”. The (lack of) agency of the signatories is 
excused with reference to this very convenient entity. The bankers, for their part, 
attempted to create a notion of agency characterized by shared suffering at the hands 
of what can only be described as a tsunami-like, almost natural, catastrophe: a pattern 
identified in other studies of the banking crisis (see e.g. Tourish & Hargie, 2012). 
Many similar examples from the financial crisis could be discussed but one 
illuminating example can stand in for many others that could be given here. In their 
aptly titled All the Devils are Here, MacLean and Nocera (2011) discuss the case of 
Merrill Lynch, which would have collapsed if Bank of America had not rescued it. In 
response to the first edition of the book, two former Merrill Lynch executives in 
charge of the CDO business, Lattanzio and Semerci, who had been identified as 
blameworthy in the first edition, had complained to the authors. In a phone 
conversation to one of the authors, Lattanzio put his case as follows: that they had 
“been singled out”, because “a convenient scapegoat” was needed. They downplayed 
their own agency by emphasizing that “by the time he took the reins of the CDO 
business, the machinery that would drive the firm’s exposure into the stratosphere was 
already well in place, and there was little he or Semerci could do to stop it.” 
(MacLean & Nocera, 2011: 6126-6131) Furthermore, he added that the decisive 
purchase of a subprime mortgage generator was decided at the “executive-suite level 
                                                 
3 This is how we let the credit crunch happen, Ma'am”.  http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/jul/26/monarchy-
credit-crunch. Heather Stewart, economics editor and The Observer, Sunday 26 July 2009. and 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7e44cbce-79fd-11de-b86f-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz1NMU2DK26 
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– and that is where the blame belongs.” (ibid) In such discourse, agency is de-
personalized into the “machinery” and shifted to other collectivities, namely the top 
management team.  
Shared suffering is of course an ancient register that features in major world 
cultures and their ‘stories’ (Frazer, 1935: 372, 575). By accepting only very limited 
responsibility for events and pointing to structural factors that were beyond their 
individual agency, the bankers, just like General North’s testimony analysed by Lynch 
and Bogen (1996) discussed above, invoke something akin to the ‘Nuremberg 
defence’ (p. 166): the defendants describe themselves as operatives with some but 
overall very limited responsibility for world historical events. Similarly, describing 
the financial crisis using the metaphor ‘tsunami’ (e.g. Q1899, Q1787 in the transcript 
we have analysed here), invokes images of the main protagonists being helpless to 
stop the crisis, being ‘swept up’ in weather-like events beyond their intention, will and 
control: what Hargie, Stapleton and Tourish (2010: 721) call the “spectre of 
impersonal global events”.  
Who (or what) is held as ultimately responsible? Individual traders, banks’ 
management boards, regulators, governments? The grammatical form and discursive 
devices in the questions posed to the bankers in our case attributed agency squarely to 
the individual, as shown in Table 2. In contrast, the bankers’ responses employed 
various discursive devices – which we present in Table 3 – in order to diffuse, deny, 
deflect, excuse, justify and collectivise agency in very different ways. Agency, we 
propose, can be understood as a discourse grammar – bound up in the very structure 
of the language used to account for events. To be clear, our argument is not that 
people have agency, and then attempt to deny it or ‘cover it up’. Rather, the question 
of whether or not a person has agency is settled by participants themselves, in 
discourse (Potter, 1996: 151). According to Rom Harré, “in an organization the person 
whose hand performed the deed may not be the one who is taken to be agentive in the 
last resort. The ordering of persons in ranks of responsibility and hence of 
agentiveness is a matter of discourse, of how roles in the company are defined” 
(Harré, 1995: 126). By implication, the meaning of being ‘responsible’ is discursively 
negotiable: indeed, it might be appropriate for us to think of it as a concept with 
diffuse boundaries (Wittgenstein, 1953: par.68-71). For example, actors might accept 
collective blame but deny individual culpability. Actors might instead accept shared 
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responsibility but deny sole or primary responsibility. Moreover, actors may accept 
responsibility for the action, but not for the outcome, like the mountaineer “whose 
shout brings down an avalanche” (Frye, 1957/71: 41). In the latter case, direct 
causality is acknowledged but almost fully detached from culpability. 
While our discursive devices approach resists simplistic cause-and-effect 
statements, it is possible to see how certain discursive constructions of agency make 
certain policy responses more plausible or desirable than others. For instance, a 
discourse of individualised ‘unbounded’ agency sets up a need for regulation to 
contain, restrict or direct agency in certain ways. Gordon Brown (2010: 106), the 
British Prime Minister at the time the crisis was first unfolding, advocated a new 
balance to be struck “between the capital that banks need, the dividends they pay, the 
remuneration they give employees, and the contribution they make to the public for 
the economic and social costs of their risk-taking.” A ‘cap’ on banker’s bonuses, or an 
enforced link between pay and longer-term sustainability, are therefore plausible 
policy responses – and have indeed been either proposed or actually implemented in 
many countries. In contrast, a discourse of external constraints and unpredictable 
events, outside the realm of human control, sets up a different kind of response: 
perhaps the need to stop “the blame game” and allow a “return to normal”, perhaps 
with stronger oversight and regulation4. It is therefore clear that the discourse of 
agency and structure “makes a difference”. The version of “what happened” clearly 
informs the question “what should be done about it?” 
Finally, it is important to note that discourses of agency and structure must be 
performed in “situationally appropriate” ways according to “culturally defined 
background expectations” (Scott & Lyman, 1968: 53). Accounts which deny, deflect 
or decrease claims to agency can easily be dismissed as fabrications and scape-goats 
intended purely to avoid blame. Accounts by politicians or policymakers (Brown, 
2010; Davies, 2010; Paulson, 2010) are primary (but by no means sole) candidates for 
being suspected of ‘fabrications’ designed to handle the author’s stake and reputation. 
Senior managers – such as the Chief Executives of the banks in our study – are 
positioned in roles which make claims to be devoid of agency, or acting in an entirely 
random manner, particularly difficult to establish. Their role bestows upon them a 
                                                 
4 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d4f02d66-1d84-11e0-a163-00144feab49a.html#ixzz1KFg6Sc5e: “Diamond says 
time for remorse is over”: “There was a period of remorse and apology; that period needs to be over” - Bob 
Diamond, quoted in Financial Times, 11 January, 2011. 
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requirement for what Harré (1995: 130) calls a “minimum discursive agentic display”. 
The discourse of leadership in particular implies a certain capacity to act and ‘make a 
difference’ – for why else would they be paid such vast sums to “lead” their 
organizations? Employees at a lower level of the organizational hierarchy, on the 
other hand, may legitimately be able to claim to have virtually no capacity for agency, 
appealing to their role as ‘functionaries’ within a wider system. In the story of the 
Enron collapse, for instance, the role of blame (and villain) was allotted to many 
parties: the US government, Enron executives, auditors, or sometimes all of them 
(Czarniawska, 2004: 9). What is clear in our case, however, is that a great deal rests 
on which story (either politicians or the bankers) becomes embedded in our society’s 
“repertoire of legitimate stories” (Czarniawska, 1997: 16). This is where non-
discursive forms of power will undoubtedly also enter the equation, influencing which 
stories become dominant. 
 
Future Research Directions 
In terms of a future research agenda, our paper has opened up space for a new 
research agenda directed toward studying the discursive devices (micro-linguistic 
tools) and interpretative repertoires (general culturally acceptable patterns of talking 
and making sense) employed to account for agency and structure during periods of 
social crisis and transformation. Future research could usefully be directed towards 
mapping the repertoires of agency and structure used by other actors implicated in the 
banking crisis and subsequent ‘era of austerity’. This could take the form of studying 
the accounts employed to justify austerity by politicians and policy-makers, accounts 
employed to legitimate or de-legitimate proposed reforms in banking practices and 
regulatory regimes, accounts made by civil society and social movements (e.g. UK 
Uncut) to question austerity-economics, and accounts in the media regarding the 
economic policies that followed the banking crisis and the subsequent budget deficit 
reduction plans.   
Another related avenue for future research would be to explore the links 
between the social, political and legal context and the discourse of agency and 
structure. For instance, how are the changing legalistic notions of responsibility linked 
to changes in our understanding of who (or what) can be said to have ‘agency’?  One 
interesting avenue for pursuing this further could be to track the broader shift from the 
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structural level (holding the corporation liable for, say, serious health and safety 
breaches) to the individual level (CEO’s can now be jailed for such offences) within 
contemporary legal discourse. Another set of research questions arises from the 
political context around how responsibility for austerity is allocated within post-crisis 
discourse, particularly how responsibility for deficit reduction is discursively 
allocated between actors such as the State, corporations, employees and welfare 
recipients. Notions of who (or what) caused the crisis – which individual agentic acts 
and which broader structural systems - are clearly going to be bound up with notions 
of who has to “pay”. In the context of the kind of austerity economics across Europe 
and beyond, where ordinary citizens rather than banking institutions are being asked 
to bear the brunt of budget cuts and deficit reduction programmes, the topic of 
discourses of agency and structure is particularly relevant for future analyses. What 
this paper has contributed is a first step in viewing agency and structure as a 
discursive process, with implications for understanding how issues of accountability 
and blame are managed, and tracing the socio-economic consequences that follow. 
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